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Abstract
Although deep neural networks have been widely applied in many application
domains, they are found to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. A recent promising
set of attacking techniques have been proposed, which mainly focus on generating
adversarial examples under digital-world settings. Such strategies are unfortunately
not implementable for any physical-world scenarios such as autonomous driving.
In this paper, we present FragGAN, a new GAN-based framework which is capable
of generating an adversarial image which differs from the original input image
only through replacing a targeted fragment within the image using a corresponding
visually indistinguishable adversarial fragment. FragGAN ensures that the resulting
entire image is effective in attacking. For any physical-world implementation, an
attacker could physically print out the adversarial fragment and then paste it onto
the original fragment (e.g., a roadside sign for autonomous driving scenarios). Frag-
GAN also enables clean-label attacks against image classification, as the resulting
attacks may succeed even without modifying any essential content of an image.
Extensive experiments including physical-world case studies on state-of-the-art
autonomous steering and image classification models demonstrate that FragGAN
is highly effective and superior to simple extensions of existing approaches. To the
best of our knowledge, FragGAN is the first approach that can implement effective
and clean-label physical-world attacks.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved tremendous success in many application domains such
as autonomous driving and image classification Hinton et al. (2012); He et al. (2017). However, recent
studies show that, even though a well-trained neural network generalizes well on the test set, it may
still be vulnerable to adversarial attacks Goodfellow et al. (2014b); Eykholt et al. (2018a); Lin et al.
(2017); Carlini and Wagner (2017); Li and Vorobeychik (2015, 2014); Kos et al. (2018). Through
adding small-magnitude perturbations to an instance, the resulting adversarial example could mislead
DNNs with a high success rate. Different approaches have been proposed for producing adversarial
examples, including the earliest work revealing the existence of such examples Szegedy et al. (2013),
and various optimization-based methods (e.g., the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) Goodfellow et al.
(2014b)) that are shown to be effective under various scenarios Carlini and Wagner (2017); Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. (2016); Liu et al. (2016); Xiao et al. (2018b); Eykholt et al. (2017). Recently, Xiao et al.
(2018a) presents a technique leveraging generative adversarial network (GAN) on the conditional
adversarial network to produce adversarial examples which may achieve high semi-blackbox attack
success rate.
Unfortunately, existing techniques on generating adversarial examples mostly focus on digital-world
attacking and are inapplicable to realistic scenarios imposing physical-world constraints, such as
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autonomous driving. One technique developed on generating physical-world adversarial example
is recently presented in Eykholt et al. (2018a). The proposed technique is highly interesting (first
of its kind) and effective to its focused scene. However, the applicability is rather limited as the
technique requires to manually stick the generated perturbations (e.g., white and black stickers) onto
the stop sign, which fails the important clean-label attack goal (i.e., human labelers shall not be able to
recognize that the stop sign gets modified in any noticeable manner). Another key technical limitation
is that the process of generating the perturbation has not considered any potential background imagery
commonly associated with the stop sign in the physical world (e.g., the sky or the road). This prevents
the technique to be implemented in realistic scenarios such as autonomous driving, since the attacking
efficacy may dramatically decrease (even ineffective at all) as the image captured by any car dash
camera will contain such background imagery besides the stop sign.
For any adversarial attacking technique to be effective in physical-world scenarios, a key challenge
(also a key difference from digital-world scenarios) is the following: only particular fragments
of an input image could be physically modified for adversarial purposes. For instance, consider
autonomous driving, it is simply impossible to implement an adversarial example in practice which
adds perturbations to the sky. Such attacks may work in digital-world yet not implementable in
physical-world. Thus, attacking techniques have to be able to generate adversarial examples through
modifying only particular fragments (e.g., roadside signs within any car dash camera-captured image
frame) instead of the entire image, while still ensuring the resulting image containing the generated
adversarial fragments to be effective in attacking.
Motivated by these observations, in this paper, we present FragGAN, a GAN-based framework that
is capable of producing arbitrary (w.r.t. size and poisition) adversarial fragments within an input
image which can be applied in physical-world scenarios such as autonomous driving, resolving the
key challenge mentioned earlier. Specifically, given an input image and the four coordinates of the
targeted quadrilateral fragment in the image, FragGAN is able to output an adversarial image which
differs from the original image only by replacing the targeted fragment with a generated adversarial
fragment visually indistinguishable from the original one. FragGAN ensures that the resulting entire
adversarial image is effective in attacking. For physical-world implementation, an attacker could
print out the adversarial fragment and paste it onto the original object (e.g., a roadside sign).
To achieve this goal, FragGAN develops a new GAN-based architecture which differs from the
existing adversarial GAN-based ones (e.g., AdvGAN Xiao et al. (2018a) and AC-GAN Song et al.
(2018)). In particular, FragGAN introduces an encoder component, which is the convolutional neural
network (CNN) part of the trained target network to pre-process the original image instance and
extract the features. Doing so enables FragGAN to generate an adversarial fragment considering
the remaining image info other than the targeted fragment. This is actually key to guarantee the
attacking efficacy of the generated adversarial example. Without this encoder, the efficacy would
dramatically decrease since the test-time prediction depends on the entire image but not the fragment
itself. Another unique feature is that FragGAN is capable of directly generating adversarial fragments
without any human intervention. This is fundamentally different from traditional GAN-based
attacking techniques (e.g., Xiao et al. (2018a)), which first generate perturbation and then add it to
the original image with a human-set co-efficient controlling perturbation intensity. Furthermore, our
design of FragGAN enables both white-box attacks and distilled attacks (i.e., the semi-blackbox
attacks defined in Xiao et al. (2018a)) which do not require to directly access the model parameters
and structure.
We prove the effectiveness and robustness of FragGAN by conducting extensive experiments using
various state-of-the-art autonomous steering models and driving-specific datasets. Results show that
FragGAN is rather effective for various steering models and scenes, yielding an average steering angle
error up to 23 degrees. We have also conducted physical-world case studies, which apply FragGAN
to generate adversarial fragments corresponding to two commonly seen roadside signs, and then print
out and paste the generated fragment physically onto the original roadside sign on campus. Results
prove the effectiveness of FragGAN when being applied to real-world driving scenarios, where a
steering angle error of 13.2 and 19.8 degree is achieved for the two scenes, respectively. We also
highlight a key novelty of our design by comparing FragGAN against a new baseline approach we
develop, which straightforwardly combines AdvGAN Xiao et al. (2018a) with the idea of generating
adversarial fragments. This comparison reveals a key technical advantage of FragGAN, that FragGAN
generates adversarial fragments with the purpose of making the resulting entire adversarial image to
be effective in attacking. Any straightforward extension of existing techniques would not be effective
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because the entire background imagery is not considered during the process of generating adversarial
fragments.
Besides application to physical-world attacks, we also demonstrate in evaluation that FragGAN
may enable practical, clean-label attacks to the general image classification domain. Being able to
generate arbitrary adversarial fragments within an input image allows an attacker to completely avoid
modifying the content essential to the task (which can be decided by the attacker). With FragGAN,
an attacker can generate adversarial fragments only corresponding to those non-essential content
belonging to the image while being effective in attacking. This would more likely enable a clean-label
adversarial example as the essential content of an input image (which actually defines the label
according to human labelers) is completely unmodified.
2 Related Work
Adversarial Examples. A number of recent techniques have been proposed to generate adversarial
examples Szegedy et al. (2013); Goodfellow et al. (2014b); Xiao et al. (2018b); Hu and Tan (2017).
The fast gradient sign method (FGSM) Goodfellow et al. (2014b) represents the first of such methods,
which performs an one-step gradient update along the direction of the sign of gradient at each
pixel. OTCM Kurakin et al. (2016) extended FGSM to a targeted attack strategy by maximizing
the probability of the target class. Several optimization-based methods Tanay and Griffin (2016);
Liu et al. (2016); Carlini and Wagner (2017); Xiao et al. (2018a) have also been proposed to craft
adversarial examples via optimization. These methods all focus on adding perturbations to the
entire image in a digital-world setting and do not consider physical-world constraints. Another
recent work Karmon et al. (2018) proposes to generate perturbations that are confined to a small,
localized patch of the image. However, there are a couple of major drawbacks associated with this
approach. First, the generated perturbation is too obvious, for any human labeler, which actually
directly contradicts with the essential benefit and motivation behind confining perturbations to a small
area of the image (i.e., generating clean-label attacks without modifying the essential content of the
image). Second, this technique targets at digital-world attacking scenarios, thus being inapplicable
to physical-world implementation. It suffers a similar yet fundamental drawback as Eykholt et al.
(2017), where the algorithm for generating perturbations does not integrate the entire background
imagery into consideration, which may cause the resulting entire image to lose attack efficacy. Both
these drawbacks are resolved in our design of FragGAN.
Physical-world attacks. A very recent set of works took the first step in studying physical-world
attacking of static physical objects Athalye et al. (2017); Metzen et al. (2017), human objects Sharif
et al. (2016); Elsayed et al. (2018), stop sign Sermanet and LeCun (2011); Mogelmose et al. (2012),
and roadside sign Zhou et al. (2018). Although these works prove to be effective under the targeted
scenarios and certain assumptions, they mostly focus on studying a static physical-world scene (e.g.,
a single snapshot of a stop sign Eykholt et al. (2018b); Sermanet and LeCun (2011)), and their
generated adversarial samples are visually unrealistic (e.g., a billboard painted by various bright
colors which are too obvious for attack purposes Zhou et al. (2018)). Moreover, as discussed earlier,
a key technical limitation is that the process of generating the perturbation has not considered any
potential background imagery commonly associated with the targeted object (e.g., a stop sign in
Eykholt et al. (2018b) and a billboard in Zhou et al. (2018)) in the physical world (e.g., the sky or
the road). This prevents the technique to be implemented in realistic scenarios such as autonomous
driving, since the attacking efficacy may dramatically decrease (even ineffective at all) as the image
captured by any car dash camera will contain such background imagery besides the stop sign.
GAN-based Methods. GAN was first introduced in Goodfellow et al. (2014a), implemented by a
system of two neural networks contesting with each other in a zero-sum game framework. GAN
is proved to be able to achieve visually appealing results in both face generation Lu et al. (2017)
and manipulation Zhu et al. (2016). In order to further improve the quality of synthesis images,
image-to-image GAN has been proposed such as the conditional GAN Isola et al. (2017) and the
CycleGAN Zhu et al. (2017), which learn a loss function to train the mapping from the input image to
the output image. Xiao et al. (2018a) presents AdvGAN, which leverages GAN to produce adversarial
samples with high success rate. Different from these GAN-based approaches, FragGAN focuses on
generating a physically implementable adversarial image in which only those arbitrarily selected
fragments in the original image are replaced using the generated adversarial fragments.
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Figure 1: Overview of the FragGAN framework.
3 Generating Adversarial Fragments
Problem Definition. Let X be the feature space with n number of features, X ⊆ Rn. Let Y be the
real value set for regression or the class set for classification. Suppose (Xi, yi) is the ith sample in
the dataset, which is composed of feature vector Xi ∈ X and yi ∈ Y , the corresponding real value or
true class label. Xi subjects to some unknown distribution Xi ∼ Pdata. The learning system aims to
learn a model f : X → Y from the feature space X to the target set Y .
Given an instance (Xi, yi), the goal of FragGAN is to produce an adversarial sample Xadv, which
aims to mislead the target neural network f as f(Xi) 6= yi. To achieve the goal, FragGAN will
generate an adversarial fragment Fadv, which is a fragment of Xi, and use it to substitute original
fragment Forig, which is the corresponding part of Xi originally, and finally output an adversarial
sample Xadv. The adversarial fragment Fadv is supposed to be close to the original fragment Forig
in terms of L2 or other distance metrics, which implies that adversarial fragment Fadv and original
fragment Forig are visually indistinguishable for human labelers.
The FragGAN Framework. Fig. 1 illustrates the overall architecture of FragGAN, which mainly
consists of four components: an encoder E , a generator G, a discriminator D and the target neural
network f . The encoder E is a convolutional neural network, which is used to extract features of
a sample (of both adversarial and original ones). The extracted features of original sample Xorig
will be used as the inputs fed to the generator to generate an adversarial fragment Fadv. Doing so
allows FragGAN to take into account the fact that different original sample Xorig may have different
influence on the generated adversarial fragment Fadv, thus ensuring the generator G to generate
the best adversarial fragment Fadv corresponding to a specific original sample Xorig. Note that
GAN-generated images are normally of square shape. Since performing a perspective mapping will
only output a quadrilateral out of a square, thus adversarial fragment Fadv and original fragment
Forig are required to be quadrilaterals. The adversarial fragment Fadv and original fragment Forig
will then be sent to the discriminator D, which is used to distinguish the adversarial fragment Fadv
and the original fragment Forig. The discriminator D can intuitively be viewed as a loss function,
which measures the visual distinction between adversarial fragment Fadv and original fragment Forig ,
and then encourages the generator to generate visually indistinguishable fragments compared to the
original ones.
To encourage the adversarial fragment Fadv generated by the generator G to be close to the original
fragment Forig, we jointly train the generator G and discriminator D. The discriminator D and
generator G form an adversarial learning scheme by optimizing the opposite object. The generative
adversarial loss LGAN Goodfellow et al. (2014a) can be written as:
LGAN = EForig∼pForig logD(Forig) + EFadv∼pFadv log(1−D(Fadv)) (1)
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Figure 2: Perspective mapping.
After obtaining the generated adversarial frag-
ment Fadv, we use it to produce an adversarial
sample Xadv by using it to replace the corre-
sponding fragment originally presented in the
image. A challenge herein is that the gener-
ated adversarial fragment Fadv is a square image
and the original fragment could be an arbitrary
quadrilateral area. We thus leverage a classi-
cal perspective mapping method per (2019) to
resolve this mismatch, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
As seen in the figure, the quadrilateral
(O, r10, r11, r01) is the original area of the original fragment Forig that is chosen to be substi-
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tuted, and the square (O, q10, q11, q01) represents the generated adversarial fragment Fadv. Since
each pixel r in the area (O, r10, r11, r01) will have one or more corresponding pixels in the area
(O, q10, q11, q01), the final RGB value of r can be calculated using existing 2-dimension interpolation
methods int (2019) such as the nearest neighbor interpolation, bilinear interpolation, or bicubic
interpolation.
The fractional linear transformation that maps the square to the quadrilateral is given by per (2019):
(y0, y1) =
(a0x0, a1x1)
(a0 + a1 − 1) + (1− a1)x0 + (1− a0)x1 , (2)
where (y0, y1) is subject to
−→
Or = y0
−−→
Or10 + y1
−−→
Or01 (3)
The fractional linear transformation that maps the quadrilateral to the square is:
(x0, x1) =
(a1(a0 + a1 − 1)y0, a0(a0 + a1 − 1)y1)
a0a1 + a1(a1 − 1)y0 + a0(a0 − 1)y1 , (4)
where the coefficients a0 and a1 are constructed as the solution of two linear equations in two
unknowns:
−−→
Or11 = a0
−−→
Or10 + a1
−−→
Or01 (5)
In order to fulfill the goal of misleading the target neural network f by an adversarial sample Xadv,
we first train the generator G jointly with the target neural network f . The target neural network f
respectively takes the extracted features of original sample Xorig and adversarial sample Xadv as its
inputs. Then, the two outputs of the target neural network f(E(Xorig)) and f(E(Xadv) are used to
calculate LfADV , which represents how much does the target neural network f is misled.
The loss for misleading the target neural network f in attack is:
LfADV = β exp(−
1
β
· lf (f(Xorig), f(Xadv))), (6)
where β is a sharpness parameter and lf denotes the loss function used to train the target neural
network f , such as MSE-loss or L1-loss for regression or cross-entropy loss for classification. By
minimizing LfADV , the distance between the prediction and the ground truth will be maximized,
which ensure the attacking effectiveness.
Finally, the ultimate objective of FragGAN can be expressed as:
L = LGAN + λLfADV , (7)
where λ denotes a coefficient to balance the tradeoff between the two terms.
To interpret this objective function, LGAN encourages the adversarial fragment Fadv to appear
visually similar to the original fragment Forig, while LfADV is leveraged to generate adversarial
sample Xadv which optimizes for high attack effectiveness. We obtain the generator G, discriminator
D by solving:
argmin
G
max
D
L. (8)
Once generator G and discriminator D are trained on the dataset and the target neural network f ,
adversarial fragment Fadv can be produced for any original sample Xorig as input to perform an
attack.
White-box Attack. For generating white-box attack under FragGAN, we assume that the target
neural network f was pre-trained and the parameters of target neural network f are fixed, and the
generator G of FragGAN can only access the parameters of the target neural network f during training.
FragGAN performs the following steps in an iterative manner to generate white-box attacks:
1. Update discriminator D given the fixed encoder E and generator G: In this step, gen-
erator G takes the extracted features E(Xorig) as its input and generates an adversarial
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Figure 3: Results on the steering angle error.
fragment Fadv. Then, we will transform the original quadrilateral fragment area into a
square fragment using the perspective mapping method and using the transformed square
fragment to substitute the original fragment Forig in the original sample Xorig . Finally, both
original fragment Forig and adversarial fragment Fadv will be used to train discriminator D,
encouraging the discriminator D to distinguish them. The objective is (see Eq. (1)):
argmax
D
LGAN . (9)
2. Update generator G given the fixed encoder E and discriminator D: In this step, gener-
ator G firstly takes the extracted feature E(Xorig) as its input and generates an adversarial
fragment Fadv. Then, the adversarial fragment Fadv, in the square shape, will be trans-
formed into the original quadrilateral shape and embedded into the sample. The resulting
sample will be the adversarial sample Xadv . Finally, adversarial sample Xadv and original
sample Xorig will be respectively sent to target neural network f . The objective of this step
is to learn a generator G which minimize the LADV (see (Eq. (6)):
argmin
G
(LGAN + λLfADV ). (10)
Distilled Attack. For generating distilled attacks under FragGAN, we assume FragGAN cannot
access the parameters of the target neural network f directly during training phase. To perform
distilled attacks, FragGAN first builds a distilled neural network Hinton et al. (2015) d based on the
target neural network f .
Once we have d distilled from the target neural network f through the knowledge distillation method,
d will behave very similar to the target neural network f according to Hinton et al. (2015). Then,
using d to substitute the target neural network position in FragGAN, we can carry out the same steps
of performing white-box attacks mentioned earlier. The knowledge distillation objective is:
argmin
d
H(d(Xorig), f(Xorig)), (11)
where d(Xorig) and f(Xorig) denote the distilled neural network and the target neural network f
(which is a black-box model herein), respectively, andH denotes the commonly used cross-entropy
loss in knowledge distillation.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we first evaluate FragGAN for both white-box and distilled attacks on state-of-the-art
autonomous steering models and datasets. These experiments cover both digital evaluation and actual
physical-world case studies. Then, we show the effectiveness of applying FragGAN for attacking
image classification models.
4.1 Apply FragGAN to Attack State-of-the-art Autonomous Steering Models
Before presenting evaluation details, we note that due to space constraints, we only put a partial set of
the experimental results in the paper (e.g., demonstrating the results focusing on the DAVE-2 steering
model instead of all four evaluated models, as well as a randomly selected set of datasets and scenes).
We put all additional evaluation results in an appendix uploaded as supplementary material.
Datasets, Steering Models, and Evaluation Metrics. For white-box attack, we use pre-trained
Convolutional Neural Network originating from NVIDIA’s DAVE-2 System dav (2019a) and three
other state-of-the-art DNN-driven autonomous steering models as the targeted steering models,
which have been widely used in autonomous driving testing Ma et al. (2018); Pei et al. (2017); Tian
et al. (2018); Zhang et al. (2018). For distilled attack, we distill each steering model to get a new
corresponding model, denoted as DAVE2-Distilled for DAVE2 for instance. The datasets used in
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Table 1: Comparison of AdvGAN, AdvGAN(fragment) and FragGAN on steering models. The blue (red, green
and purple, respectively) arrow indicates the ground truth steering angle (the erroneous steering angle due to
FragGAN, AdvGAN, and AdvGAN(frag), respectively.
our experiments include: (1) Udacity automatic driving car challenge dataset uda (2019) which
contains 101396 training images captured by a dashboard-mounted camera of a driving car and the
simultaneous steering wheel angle applied by a human driver for each image; (2) DAVE-2 testing
dataset Pan et al. (2017); dav (2019b) which contains 45,568 images to test the NVIDIA DAVE-2
model; and (3) Kitti Geiger et al. (2013) dataset which contains 14,999 images from six different
scenes captured by a VW Passat station wagon equipped with four video cameras. We evaluate the
efficacy of the attacking by measuring the average steering angle error among all frames in each
evaluated scene, which denotes steering angle divergence between the ground-truth steering angle
and the misled steering angle under FragGAN.
Driving Scene Selection Criteria. Our driving scene selection criteria is that the roadside traffic or
advertising boards should appear entirely in the first frame of a driving video with more than 400
pixels and partially disappear in the last frame. We select seven scenes from the aforementioned
datasets and evaluate on all selected scenes. We present results on a partial set of scenes in the paper
and include the rest in an appendix.
White-box Attack. For White-box attack, we train the generator in FragGAN using the originally
trained target steering models, which is a convolutional neural network. The adversarial fragment
generated by FragGAN will be mapped into every image according to the perspective mapping
method to produce an adversarial example image. Then we use the target steering models to predict
the adversarial images and compare them against the ground-truth steering decisions recorded in a
given scene that we select according to the aforementioned criteria.
Distilled Attack. For distilled attack, we firstly train a distilled steering model from each evaluated
steering model, using the knowledge distillation method, and then train the generator in FragGAN
using each distilled model. After the adversarial fragments are generated, they are mapped into their
corresponding frame to produce the adversarial examples. Finally, we use each of the four evaluated
steering models to predict the steering angle through the adversarial images and compare them against
the ground-truth steering angle recorded in a given scene.
Comparison against Existing Approaches. To highlight the efficacy and novelty of FragGAN, we
have compared against other approaches including AdvGAN Xiao et al. (2018a), and AdvGAN(frag),
a straightforward extension of AdvGAN integrating the idea of generating only adversarial fragments.
AdvGAN(frag) applies AdvGAN to add perturbations only to the same fragments targeted by
FragGAN. We note that comparing FragGAN directly against AdvGAN is actually unfair because,
in practice, it is simply impossible to add perturbations to an entire image frame captured by an
on-vehicle camera.
Results. The attacking effectiveness results in terms of the steering angle error along the timeline
for four scenes are shown in Fig. 3, where the x-axis is the indexes of the image frame along the
timeline, and the y-axis is the steering angle error. Note that for digital-world evaluations, we generate
an adversarial fragment under each evaluated scene for each frame, as the four coordinates of the
targeted fragment are different in different frames.
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Figure 4: Comparison among FragGAN, AdvGAN, and AdvGAN(frag) on different datasets and the DAVE-2
model.
We observe that under both Dave-2 and the distilled Dave-2 models, FragGAN is able to cause a
noticeable steering angle error under all scenes. For instance, for the Kitti Straight2 scene, an average
steering angle error of 12.5 and 6.1 degrees are achieved among all frames under the Dave-2 and
the distilled model, respectively. Moreover, the maximum angle error is quite significant, ranging
from 13–23 degrees and 5-12.5 degrees under the Dave-2 and the distilled model among all scenes,
respectively. Such large angle errors could cause dangerous driving actions and accidents in practice.
We also observe that the generator trained by the distilled model yields weaker performance, which is
due to the typical knowledge loss due to the distilling process Hinton et al. (2015).
For the comparison with AdvGAN, sample results are shown in the second and third rows in the
Table 1. The observation is that FragGAN yields similar (a few cases better) attacking effectiveness
in terms of steering angle error compared to AdvGAN. This shows the strength of FragGAN as
this evaluation (in an unfair manner) allows AdvGAN to modify the entire digital image. The first
and third rows in Table 1 show the result of the comparison between FragGAN and AdvGAN(frag).
AdvGAN(frag) yields a minimal degree of attacking efficacy as the steering angle under the adversarial
scenario is almost identical to the ground truth steering angle; while FragGAN is able to mislead the
steering model by a significant margin. As mentioned earlier, this highlights the technical novelty of
FragGAN of developing a new GAN-based architecture which can generate adversarial fragments
with the purpose of making the resulting entire adversarial image to be effective in attacking, through
considering the entire background imagery during the process of generating adversarial fragments.
Physical-world Case Studies. We also perform a set of proof-of-concept physical-world case studies.
We target the roadside sign commonly seen during driving as the fragment of our interest. We use
FragGAN to generate two adversarial fragments corresponding to two common advertising signs for
McDonald’s and Apple Watch, assuming a fixed distance between a car dash camera and the roadside
sign. We then print out and paste each adversarial fragment onto the original sign in the physical
world, and perform an evaluation using the image captured by a car dash camera from the same
distance. Table 2 shows the results. As seen in the first and second columns of this table, FragGAN is
able to generate adversarial fragments that are visually indistinguishable from the original ones,
thus satisfying the clean-label property. The last column of Table 2 demonstrate that FragGAN is
able to mislead the steering angle by a noticeable degree, specifically, 13.2 and 19.8 degrees for the
McDonald’s and Apple Watch scene, respectively.
Physical Test
Fragments Scene
M
c
A
pp
le
Table 2: Physical-world case studies using FragGAN, which gener-
ates adversarial fragments (first column) corresponding to the original
roadside advertising signs (second column). The third column shows
the snapshot of the physical world case study where the fragments are
printed out and pasted onto the original sign, where the blue (red) arrow
indicates the ground truth (erroneous) steering angle.
Figure 5: Original samples (left
subfigure of each row) and the
generated adversarial samples
(right subfigure of each row).
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FGSM AdvGAN AdvGAN(Frag) FragGAN
Dog 6.2% 13.3% 9.7% 11.5%
Cat 5.8% 12.5% 7.6% 8.7%
Bridge 7.3% 11.7% 5.5% 12.2%
Tower 8.6% 12.9% 6.1% 11.7%
Table 3: Comparison results.
4.2 Applying FragGAN to Image Classification
We also evaluate the effectiveness of applying FragGAN to attack image classification models on two
different datasets. We first trained a dog-cat classification neural network using the dataset "Dogs vs.
Cats kag (2019)" as the target model. We selected another 217 images (113 dog images and 104 cat
images) as the test samples. We also trained a classification neural network using LSUN Yu et al.
(2015), and the test set consists of 326 images (163 tower images and 163 bridge images). Note that
we perform this set of the experiment using a limited set of dataset due to the fact that for each image
in the evaluated dataset, we have to mark the 4 coordinates of the fragments targeted by FragGAN.
The goal is to use FragGAN to generate adversarial fragments with attacking effectiveness without
modifying pixels belonging to the essential content of each image (i.e., dog or cat). We compare
against existing methods, including FGSM, AdvGAN, and AdvGAN(fragment).
Fig. 5 shows several samples of the original images and the generated images with the adversarial frag-
ments. We observe that FragGAN is able to generate fragments which are visually indistinguishable
from the original, without even touching any area that contains the essential content. Table 3 shows
the attack success rate on the dataset. As seen in the table, only AdvGAN yields better performance
than FragGAN due to the unfair comparison, where FragGAN only modifies a non-essential fragment
while AdvGAN is allowed to add perturbations to the entire image. When given a fair comparison,
i.e., against AdvGAN(Frag), we observe a clearly superior performance yielded by FragGAN for both
sets of experiments. FragGAN is able to increases the attacking success rate by 1.8% and 6.7% for
the “Dog vs. Cat” and the “bridge and tower” LSUN dataset, respectively. This proves the attacking
effectiveness of FragGAN which does not need to modify any essential content of the input.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose FragGAN, a GAN-based framework that is capable of generating effective
and arbitrary adversarial quadrilateral fragments within any input image. FragGAN enables effective
and clean-label attacks applicable to (and implementable under) physical world scenarios such as
autonomous driving. Experimental results on both autonomous steering and image classification
models prove that FragGAN is highly effective and superior to state-of-the-art approaches.
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Appendix (as Supplementary Material)
Detailed description on the attributes of the selected scenes (Sec. 4.1).
The evaluated eight scenes in each dataset cover both straight and curved lane scenarios. Since all
these datasets do not contain coordinates of roadside signs, we have to label the four corners of the
signs in every frame of the selected scenes. We use the motion tracker functionality of Adobe After
Effects1 to automatically track the movement of the sign’s four corners among consecutive frames.
Table 4 shows the attributes of the scenes we selected. Table 5 shows a sample original targeted
fragment and the corresponding image frame under the eight evaluated scenes.
Scenes Images Size min max
Dave-straight1 54 455× 256 21× 22 41× 49
Dave-curve1 34 455× 256 29× 32 51× 49
Udacity-straight1 22 640× 480 48× 29 66× 35
Udacity-curve1 (1)(2) 80 640× 480 51× 51 155× 156
Kitti-straight1 20 455× 1392 56× 74 121× 162
Kitti-straight2 21 455× 1392 80× 46 247× 100
Kitti-curve1 21 455× 1392 64× 74 173× 223
Table 4: Scenes evaluated in the experiments.
Dave Udacity Kitti
Straight1 Curve1 Straight1 Curve1(1) Curve1(2) Straight1 Curve1 Straight2
O
ri
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l
Table 5: The original targeted fragments and the corresponding entire image frames under various scenes. Note
that Tables 6-9 generate adversarial fragments under different models corresponding to the original scenes
presented in this table.
1https://www.adobe.com/products/aftereffects.html
1
Additional Evaluation Results on All Evaluated Four Autonomous Steering
Models, Three Datasets, and Eight Scenes
In our submitted draft, due to space constraints, we only present evaluation results using the DAVE-2
steering model and a partial set of datasets and scenes. We now present all the evaluation results
using all four state-of-the-art steering models including Dave-2, Dave-2_V2,2 Dave-2_V3,3 and
the Epoch model from the Udacity challenge.4 Dave-2 is the original CNN architecture presented
in NVIDIA’s Dave-2 System (Fig 6). Dave-2_V2 is a variation of Dave-2 which normalizes the
randomly initialized net work weights and removes the first batch normalization layer. Dave-2_V3 is
another publicly available steering model which modifies the original Dave model by removing two
convolution layers and one fully connected layer, and inserting two dropout layers among the three
fully connected layers. As a pre-trained model, Epoch’s weights are not publicly available, we train
it following the instructions provided by the corresponding authors using the Udacity self-driving
Challenge dataset.5
Tables 6–9 respectively show a demonstration of the adversarial examples generated by FragGAN
based upon the original image frames shown in Table 5 for the aforementioned four steering models.
For each scene, the blue arrows indicate ground truth steering angles, the red arrows indicate steering
angle due to the adversarial sample generated by FragGAN under original steering models, and the
green arrows indicate steering angle affected by the adversarial sample generated by FragGAN under
the corresponding distilled model. As we can observe from table, FragGAN is able to generate rather
realistic adversarial fragments (thus images) which are visually indistinguishable from the original
ones.
Fig. 7-10 show the attacking effectiveness results on the four evaluated autonomous steering models
in terms of the steering angle error along the timeline for all eight scenes. The results are similar to
Fig. 3 presented in the submitted draft, which prove FragGAN to be effective and robust in attacking
various state-of-the-art steering models and datasets.
2https://github.com/jacobgil/keras-steering-angle-visualizations
3https://github.com/navoshta/behavioral-cloning
4https://github.com/udacity/self-driving-car/tree/master/steering-models/community-models/cg23
5https://medium.com/udacity/challenge-2-using-deep-learning-to-predict-steering-angles-f42004a36ff3
2
Figure 6: Architecture of Dave-2.
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Table 6: The generated adversarial fragments under Dave-2 and its distilled model.
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(c) Udacity Straight1
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(d) Udacity Curve1(1)
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(e) Udacity Curve1(2)
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(f) Kitti Straight1
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(g) Kitti Curve1
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(h) Kitti Straight2
Figure 7: Results on the steering angle error under Dave-2.
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Table 7: The generated adversarial fragments under Dave-2_V2 and its distilled model.
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(b) Dave Curve1
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(c) Udacity Straight1
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 64 72 80
Frame Index
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
15.0
17.5
20.0
An
gl
e 
Er
ro
r
Dave-2_V2
Distilled
(d) Udacity Curve1(1)
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(e) Udacity Curve1(2)
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(f) Kitti Straight1
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(g) Kitti Curve1
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Figure 8: Results on the steering angle error under Dave-2_V2.
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Table 8: The generated adversarial fragments under Dave-2_V3 and its distilled model.
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(c) Udacity Straight1
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(d) Udacity Curve1(1)
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(e) Udacity Curve1(2)
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(f) Kitti Straight1
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(g) Kitti Curve1
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Figure 9: Results on the steering angle error under Dave-2_V3
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Table 9: The generated adversarial fragments under Epodch and its distilled model.
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(c) Udacity Straight1
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(d) Udacity Curve1(1)
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(e) Udacity Curve1(2)
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(f) Kitti Straight1
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(g) Kitti Curve1
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Figure 10: Results on the steering angle error under Epoch
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